

~~SECRET~~

CS 091 Germany (30 Jun 61)

30 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(Installations and Logistics)

SUBJECT: Alleged Superiority of West German Over United States
Conventional Equipment

1. In accordance with your request of 27 June, our action concerning the subject allegations has been revised to meet the desires of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) that it cover a broader scope than comparison of current conventional equipment in the hands of U. S. and West German troops. A recommended memorandum for ASD (ISA) is attached.

2. Informal conversations with representatives of ASD (ISA) have established the detailed desires of that office as follows:

a. The allegations should be examined in the broadest sense, and in the context of the conversations.

b. Two things are required: a basis for reply to the President's questions, and a talking paper (presumably for Sec Def's use during the forthcoming Strauss visit).

c. The action should be in ISA hands on 5 July.

3. It is recommended that you and Mr. Stahr review the attached memorandum, and that you forward it to reach ASD (I&L) on 5 July 1961.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

(OFFICIAL - CIVIL)

J. L. Throckmorton

Incl

Proposed memo
w/inclosures

J. L. THROCKMORTON
Major General, GS
Secretary of the General Staff

CLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~SECRET~~

JUL 3 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)

SUBJECT: Alleged Superiority of West German Over United States
Conventional Equipment

In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum I-14812/61 of 17 June, I forward the attached Discussion Paper and Fact Sheet for your use in replying to the President's query and in possible discussions of the subject with Defense Minister Strauss during his forthcoming visit. Both papers address the subject in the context in which Mr. Strauss made the allegations during his reported conversations with Dr. Kissinger.

As State Message 1943 (20 May 1961) from Bonn points out, it is obvious that many of Mr. Strauss' statements are substantively incorrect or misleading, and must be considered in the light of his concern over possible developments in U. S. policy and West German politics. Basically, he appears in many instances to have been considering overall conventional capabilities (as represented by the combined effects of organization, numbers of weapons, and the like) rather than the specific quality or characteristics of individual items of equipment. In those cases where the latter basis is obviously used, he must be making reference to German design or prototype equipment, since West German forces are currently equipped almost exclusively with U. S. types.

2 Incl

1. Discussion Paper
2. Fact Sheet

Paul R. Ignatius
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Logistics)

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 10 YEARS
DDO DIR 5, 10, 10

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

000000 1300

~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION PAPER

Following is proposed as a general approach to be taken in discussing with Defense Minister Strauss questions of conventional capabilities and conventional equipment, as he raised them in reported conversations with Dr. Kissinger.

1. I understand and appreciate your concern over attaining the proper balance between nuclear and conventional capabilities in our NATO forces, and the various interpretations which may have been placed on our recent proposals for a relative increase in conventional capabilities. Let me assure you, as other U. S. representatives have:

- That we fully intend to maintain the credibility of the nuclear deterrent.
- That we have no intention of placing unwarranted reliance on conventional weapons alone.
- That we therefore plan for all shield forces, including German, to have appropriate nuclear support.
- That we appreciate the considerable conventional potential already possessed by the Bundeswehr and look forward to still further potential in your forces.

2. In this latter connection, I was interested in the views you expressed, in your conversations with Dr. Henry Kissinger last May, concerning the relative conventional capabilities of German and U. S. NATO forces. Many of the points you made were well taken, but you may not be fully aware of some developments and aspects of the problem from our point of view. Your discussion indicated that you properly assess conventional capabilities on the basis of the combined influence of organization and equipment. You will therefore be interested in our general plans in both of these areas:

- We plan an early reorganization of our divisions into new armored, mechanized, infantry, and airborne types. One particular goal is to increase conventional capabilities over those possessed by

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~SECRET~~

the current Pentomic organization. The new divisions will be specifically "tailored" for individual missions, including those of our NATO units, through assignment of varying numbers of tank, mechanized, and infantry battalions. This organization will have several characteristics in common with your brigade-type organization.

- As for conventional weapons, we are far from satisfied with the equipment currently in the hands of our troops. However, we have made considerable progress and look forward to more fundamental improvements. In artillery, we have developed conventional shells of greatly increased lethality, significantly extended the ranges of our light, medium, and heavy weapons, and developed greatly-improved self-propelled models. The new U. S. 175mm gun -- on a lightweight, self-propelled carriage -- is now under contract. It will outrange any conventional cannon in the world, with an accuracy heretofore achieved only in howitzer-type weapons. In addition, we have under development extremely lightweight howitzers in both towed and self-propelled configurations. In tanks, we have made substantial improvements in ballistic protection, operating range, fire control, gun power, and over-all design, but we look forward to early availability of a new-concept combat vehicle weapon system which will greatly increase first-round kills, allow for significant weight reductions and other improved characteristics. Our armored personnel carriers have evolved to the current standard model which is considerably lighter and more maneuverable and has air-drop and amphibious capabilities. In design stage, we have newer, diversified models including reconnaissance-type fighting vehicles, some of which will mount our new combat vehicle weapon system.

- You are, of course, familiar with some of our newer equipment, such as the M60 tank, the M113 personnel carrier, and the 155mm, 8-inch, and 175mm self-propelled artillery pieces -- items which you have acquired or expressed an interest in. These represent examples of what we now have, or will soon have available, but our development hardly stops here.

3. Our mutual interest in modernization and standardization certainly makes greater collaboration in development and production appealing from the point of view of both nations. Ideally, this should be organized on as broad a basis as possible among the NATO nations. As you know, we continue to give these problems urgent consideration.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

- We have great respect for German experience and capabilities in these matters, and thus welcome participation on your part.

- There are, however, certain limits to the mutuality of our equipment problems, which we in the U. S. must always recognize. Basically, Germany has one great strategic problem, one well-defined area of operations, which we share in our NATO relationships. The United States, as you fully recognize, has many such problems and areas -- even granted that no other is as critical as NATO. We must take these other problems and areas into account in our plans for standard U. S. organizations, weapons, and equipment.

4. I am confident that we can, together, face and solve these problems of proper nuclear-conventional balance. In this connection, I was greatly reassured by your expression to Dr. Kissinger of the opinion that we have no real, fundamental differences in basic defense policy. With this opinion I heartily agree.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FACT SHEET

Following are the major points made by Defense Minister Strauss, in his reported conversations with Dr. Kissinger, which have bearing on the comparison of conventional equipment and/or capabilities. Facts concerning each such point are summarized after statement of the issue or allegation.

General Points

1. There is concern in Germany over the "forthcoming change" in U. S. views on NATO military policy. Various German interpretations of possible implications are:

a. That removal of nuclear weapons from Germany would result in unilateral adoption of a "Rapacki" plan.

b. That removal of nuclear weapons from shield forces is planned, which would mean sole reliance on conventional response, a situation of which the Soviets would take maximum advantage.

c. That German forces would not be provided nuclear weapons support, while other NATO elements would, thus resulting in discrimination.

(These are obvious exaggerations as far as informed German evaluation is concerned. They are refuted by Mr. Strauss' own subsequent statement that there are no real, fundamental differences on basic defense policy between the U. S. and West Germany. Despite current differences in interpretation, both recognize the need for a balance of conventional and nuclear capabilities.)

2. The West should not plan to fight a conventional war unless it is also ready to fight a nuclear war.

(This is a valid statement. There is no feature of U. S. planning or equipment development which does not recognize this fact.)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

3. Mr. Strauss has always stressed the need for a conventional buildup, and at the present time the Bundeswehr is superior to other NATO forces (including U. S.) in this regard. Their (brigade-type) organization has greater conventional potential than our Pentomic division, and they are better "equipped" for conventional operations.

(This allegation must be considered from the point of view of the combined effects on over-all conventional capabilities of organization and numbers of conventional weapons employed, as well as characteristics of individual items of equipment. The German organization does have certain advantages over our Pentomic organization for conventional operations. We have, however, a reorganization plan which will increase the conventional capabilities of our divisions, "tailor" these capabilities for specific missions (including those visualized for NATO shield forces), and have certain characteristics in common with the German organization. German forces are presently equipped almost exclusively with U. S. equipment types -- in many cases older models than those employed by U. S. units in Europe. The inclosure lists West German inventories in the categories of equipment discussed. Thus, any claim that they are currently "better" equipped can represent only a contention that their units rely on a greater weight of conventional equipment, in view of their relative lack of nuclear-capable weapons, than do U. S. units as presently organized. Our reorganization plans will increase the relative weight of conventional equipment in U. S. units.)

Specific Points Relating to Equipment

1. The U. S. has made no significant progress in the design of conventional weapons since WW II.

(This statement is not in accord with fact. While it is true that, in the main, weapons presently in the hands of troops are improved versions of WW II designs, we have made significant progress in such improvements, with the result that new designs of almost all conventional weapons are now in production and in some instances, in the hands of troops in limited quantities. It should be emphasized that we are not satisfied with these current models, and have under development far more advanced concepts and designs. Examples are:

Artillery: Great improvement in lethality of conventional shells, extended ranges for light, medium, and heavy artillery, greatly-improved self-propelled artillery pieces -- all starting production or in latter stages of development. The new lightweight self-propelled family, consisting of 105mm, 155mm, and 8-inch Howitzers, and the 175mm Gun, is of particular significance. These weapons represent a marked increase in range and lethality and, in the case of the 175mm

~~SECRET~~
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~SECRET~~

Gun, the U. S. has a weapon which outranges all known Russian artillery. Still more advanced artillery designs are under development.

Tanks: Considerable improvement in light and medium models, fire-control, operating range, gun capabilities -- as currently represented in the M60 tank. The M60 is considered superior to any known tank of its class now in production. Under development are the air-transportable reconnaissance and assault vehicle (light tank) and a new-concept combat vehicle weapon (SHILLELAGH).

Armored Personnel Carriers: Over-all improvement in models, overhead armor protection, lighter weight, air-drop and amphibious capability -- as currently represented in the M113.

Although it is not conclusive, evidence of the relative esteem with which the Germans view U. S. equipment is provided by: their acceptance of the U. S. M48 tank and interest in the M60, their expression of interest in \$85 million worth of new U. S. artillery, and their informal indication of acceptance of 1,030 U. S. M113 armored personnel carriers.)

2. If we wish to fight either a conventional or a nuclear war, we should adopt an armored personnel carrier from which troops can fight, as he has long advocated.

(This concept may have certain validity, particularly for the type combat the Germans visualize in Europe. However, we recognize a great need for general-purpose personnel carriers to perform the basic function of moving infantry elements which will be required in most cases to fight dismounted. If personnel carriers are to be designed as fighting vehicles, the basic purpose and hence the design of the vehicle must change so as to provide ballistic protection against heavy machine guns and light antitank weapons, and stability as a platform for main armament weapons. This requirement greatly increases the weight and cost, and endangers other characteristics such as amphibious capability. Therefore, U. S. philosophy is to design general-purpose personnel carriers primarily for the role of battlefield transportation, emphasizing strategic and tactical mobility, and to design separate vehicles for the armored reconnaissance and light tank roles. This difference in philosophy has arisen in the NATO ad hoc mixed working group on armored personnel carriers. However, German representatives, unlike the French, continue to express great interest in the U. S. M113 to fulfill a requirement for an "armored transport" vehicle. This is only one manifestation of the fact, further discussed below, that Europeans generally face a far less complicated strategic situation than we do.)

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~SECRET~~

3. There is an urgent requirement for combined efforts toward greater modernization and standardization. Results of such efforts would include more German orders for U. S. equipment, and more confidence in NATO reliance on a conventional response when appropriate.

(We recognize this requirement. We support standardization, and are participating actively in each project of the NATO Research, Development and Production Program. Defense is currently studying the optimum extent to which we should rely on foreign sources (specifically including German) for weapons research, development, and production. There are, however, limitations on the extent to which the U. S. can standardize on models particularly adapted to the NATO environment. West Germany faces one strategic problem, one piece of terrain; the U. S. faces many.)

4. The Bundeswehr "has" specific superiority in tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers.

(As indicated earlier, this can only be taken generally as a reference to non-U. S. equipment which is in the concept, development, or prototype stage. The Germans do not now manufacture any major weapons. Their armaments manufacture of significance is limited to: an experimental antitank guided missile (COBRA), and two armored personnel carriers. They certainly possess great potential to expand their armaments industry, under a mutually-acceptable modernization and standardization program. Aside from the so-called Franco-German tank, which is still in prototype stage, a possible example of equipment which Mr. Strauss may have had in mind is the German prototype armored personnel carrier. The Hispano-Suiza design which he has advocated incorporates neither air-drop nor amphibious capabilities. The HS30 model, which they were producing, has been reported to be seriously underpowered. It is understood that production of this model has been stopped, and that the Germans are proceeding with development of a new version.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

INVENTORY OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

<u>Category</u>		<u>Country of Origin</u>	<u>Quantity on Hand</u>	<u>*Classification</u>
<u>Arty</u>	105mm How, M2A1	United States	209	Std B
	155mm How, M1	United States	67	Std B
	155mm Gun, M2	United States	55	Std B
	8-in How, M2 w/carr M1	United States	41	Std A
	Crg Mtr, Multi Gun M16	United States	192	Obsolete
	Crg Mtr, 105mm How (all models)	United States	171	Obsolete
	Crg Mtr, 155mm How, M44	United States	117	Std B
	Lchr, 762mm rkt, trk-mtd. M289	United States	18	Std B
<u>Armor</u>	Lt Tk, 76mm Gun, M41	United States	600	Std B
	M Tk, 90mm Gun, M47	United States	1,111	Obsolete
	M Tk, 90mm Gun, M48A1/A2	United States	1,346	Std B
	Vehicle, Tk Recov, T74, T51	United States	360	Std B
	Vehicle, Armd, M39	United States	32	Obsolete
	M Tk, M60	United States	2	Std A
	APC, 15 cwt 4 x 4	Canada	3	
<u>Armored Personnel Carrier</u>	APC, short, Hotchkiss (1,729 on order)	French (German produced)	378	
	APC, HS30 (Hispano Suiza) (1,360 on order)	(German produced)		

*Std A - Preferred item.

Std B - Operationally acceptable, not procured; usually used as a substitute for Std A.

REPRODUCED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~SECRET~~

NOTE: Either the same equipment as that listed above or more modern equipment is provided to Forces in Europe.

~~SECRET~~Coord Gp/Lt Col Moody/76261
30 June 1961

GENERAL EDDLEMAN

SGS

Mr. Strauss' Allegations Concerning Superiority of West German Equipment

1. On 19 June, the Army received a request from ISA (Mr. Bundy) to prepare a "study" constituting a "frank and objective appraisal" of the subject allegations, made by West German Defense Minister Strauss in his May conversations with Dr. Kissinger. This was to be submitted by 21 June. The Army understood that its analysis was to be restricted to a comparison of current conventional ground force equipment of the two nations, and replied on that basis, although there were far broader implications involved in the Strauss-Kissinger conversations. Both you and Secretary Stahr approved the action.

2. ISA considered the Army reply far too restricted for the purpose intended and requested verbally, to ASA (I&L) on 26 June, that it be redone. As the result of conversations with ISA representatives, on 27-28 June, the desires of ISA were established as follows:

a. The allegations should be examined in the broadest sense, and in the context of the conversations.

b. Two things are required: a basis for reply to the President's questions, and a talking paper (presumably for Sec Def's use during the forthcoming Strauss visit).

c. The action should be in ISA hands on 5 July.

3. The attached memorandum, forwarding a discussion paper and fact sheet has been prepared on this basis. DCSOPS, DCSLOG, CRD, and ACSI concur.

4. Recommend your approval of the attached forwarding memorandum to ASA (I&L).

APPROVED _____

SEE ME _____

UNCLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DDO DIA 580010~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : GENERAL DECKER
: GENERAL EDDLEMAN (Info)

Lt Col Allen
DATE: 29 June 61

FROM : SGS

CS 091 Germany (27 June 61)

SUBJECT: Alleged Superiority of West German Over U.S. Conventional Equipment (S)

1. By 17 June memo, ASD/ISA directed the SA to prepare a study regarding allegations made by Mr. Strauss, Defense Minister, FRG, to Dr. Kissinger, Special Advisor to the President. The allegations covered, with varying degrees of emphasis, defense policies, concept of limited war, the superiority of German conventional weapons, the superiority of the German Army combat organization, and other subjects of a political/military nature.

2. ASA(I&L) referred this matter to the CofS with verbal guidance that emphasis should be placed on Mr. Strauss' allegations regarding superiority of German conventional equipment over U.S. conventional equipment. DCSLOG prepared, with concurrence of DCSOPS, ACSI, and CRD, a proposed reply to ISA for signature of ASA(I&L). VCofS approved this reply on 22 June. ASA(I&L), after receiving approval from the SA, signed and dispatched the Army proposed memo (incl 1) on 23 June.

3. On 27 June, ASA(I&L) memo again referred the action to the CofS stating ISA advised that the President requires a specific point-by-point discussion of and answer to Mr. Strauss' criticism. Additionally, a talking paper for the Sec/Def must be prepared. This paper was received in OCS on 28 June (incl 2).

4. On 28 June, additional verbal guidance was received from ISA that the Army reply is to discuss all facets of Mr. Strauss' allegations - not confining reply to equipment as directed in ASA(I&L) memo of 27 June. Additionally, the previously stated suspense date of 10 July was changed to 5 July.

5. To expedite this action it will be handled on an ad hoc basis by Coordination Group with requests for assistance being placed on staff sections as required.

NOTED

SEE ME

SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

JUN 27 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Alleged Superiority of West German Over United States
Conventional Equipment (S)

1. Reference is made to:


- a. Memorandum OASD/ISA, I-14812/61, subject as above,
17 June 1961.
- b. Memorandum OASA(I&L), subject as above, 23 June 1961.

2. Mr. Barringer, OASD(ISA) has informed that the President will need to have in hand a specific answer to Mr. Straus's criticism on a point-by-point basis. The ASD(ISA) wants a talking paper which the Secretary of Defense can forward to the President which will answer Mr. Straus's criticism of United States equipment. This talking paper is to be used also in discussions with Mr. Straus on his forthcoming visit scheduled for 14 July 1961 and should include, to the extent feasible, the characteristics and limitations of United States armor, artillery, and armored personnel carriers as compared with what the Germans have. It should also include the characteristics and limitations of equipment the United States is planning compared to equipment the Germans are planning.

3. It is requested that a talking paper as described in paragraph 2 above be prepared for submission to the ASD(ISA) by 10 July 1961.

FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):

OASA (I&L) CONTROL No. 556


WILLIAM H. GURNEE, Jr.
Colonel, GS
Executive

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DDO GPO 100010

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CS 091 Germany (27 Jun 61)

1821